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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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INTERNATIONAL POLICY FEATURE: SALT

From the Secretary of State

Letter to President Explains SALT Agreements

This is the third in a series of articles devoted to President Richard Nixon's recent Summit Meetings in the Soviet Union. The *Commanders Digest* issue of June 15, 1972, contained an overview of the Moscow Summit Talks, reprinting verbatim, the *Joint U.S.-Soviet Communique* and the *Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. The issue of June 22, 1972, contained the actual diplomatic instruments submitted to the Congress for its approval, i.e., President Nixon's letter to the Senate, the Treaty itself, the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, and a Department of Defense Fact Sheet. This issue of the *Digest* reprints Secretary of State William P. Rogers' letter to President Nixon of June 13, 1972, explaining the diplomatic agreements in full detail.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972

The President:

I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recommendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

ABM TREATY

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

—A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for such deployment, are prohibited;

—An ABM deployment for defense of an individual region is prohibited, except as specifically permitted;

—Permitted ABM deployments will be limited to two widely separated deployment areas in each country—one for the national capital, and the other for defense of ICBMs;

—For these purposes no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 150-kilometer radius

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ROGERS' LETTER

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ABM deployment area, for a total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 deployed ABM launchers for each Party;

—ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars to support the ABM defense of the national capital may be deployed only in a specified number of small radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited to a specified number within the ABM deployment area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corollary provisions were also agreed:

—Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based are prohibited;

—Deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is prohibited;

—The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems, or components thereof to perform an ABM role is prohibited.

The Treaty also contains certain general provisions relating to the verification and implementation of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

—Each side will use national technical means for verification and the Parties agree not to interfere with such means and not to take deliberate concealment measures;

—A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to facilitate implementation of the Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder;

—The Parties will continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and sixteen Articles. As indicated in Article I(1), it provides for limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) systems as well as certain related measures. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

PREAMBLE

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set forth common premises and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraphs indicate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on antiballistic missile systems will be an important factor in curbing competition in the strategic offensive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, create a favorable climate for future negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indicate the relationship of this Treaty to the undertaking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," and express the intention of the Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad international consensus that effective measures to limit strategic arms will assist in relaxing international tensions and strengthening trust between nations. As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic steps toward broader political goals.

A. LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS

(1) Deployment

Article I(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM systems which would provide defense covering substantially the whole of the territory of a Party. ABM defenses of individual regions are also prohibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. As more fully explained below, that Article limits not only the number, size and locations of the permitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article I(2) also includes an undertaking not to provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense. This would, for example, prohibit the construction and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capable radars deployed for other purposes, that could provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Articles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence or other non-ABM systems *per se*. However, it does prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems or their components to perform an ABM role; moreover, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any phased-array radars over a certain size except as otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. This would prevent the possible use of such radars as a base for nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." It indicates that such systems currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an interceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role (including target tracking or missile control, but not early warning), or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear that the ABM system components listed in the first paragraph of the Article include not only those which are operational, but also those under construction, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of

(See ROGERS' LETTER, Page 11)

High Priority To Equal Opportunity

Secretary Laird Dedicates Race Relations Institute

The Armed Forces have some things to boast about in the field of race relations, says Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. They also have problems. None of these problems should be underestimated, and none should be "swept under the rug." But "let us not overlook the achievements that give us confidence in prospects for future progress."

The Defense chief made these statements during a forceful keynote address he delivered May 11 at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., in ceremonies formally dedicating the Defense Department's unique new educational institution, the Defense Race Relations Institute.

"This Institute," he said, "stands as physical evidence of our recognition of the problems and our determination to deal with them."

The Defense Race Relations Institute received its charter almost 11 months ago in a Department of Defense directive which requires a continuing program of education in race relations for all members of the Armed Forces.

The mission of the Institute is two-fold: to develop content and methodology for the DoD education program, and to train a corps of race relations instructors who will both teach and train others to teach. The goal of the education program is to teach majority and minority-group members how to resolve racial and ethnic conflicts by peaceful means.

Throughout his address, Secretary Laird stressed the high priority which he accords to the problems of equal opportunity and race relations.

"The act of establishing this Institute, and the degree of high-level attention which it has received since its beginnings, should indicate the seriousness of purpose of the Department of Defense and the high value which I, the civilian Service Secretaries and the uniformed chiefs of our four Armed Services attach to this enterprise," he told his audience.

"We—you and I —and the 'you' includes faculty, staff and students—are undertaking a significant, an important, and a necessary task."

DEDICATION SPEECH. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird delivers the keynote address at formal dedication ceremonies for the Defense Race Relations Institute held May 11 at Patrick AFB, Florida.

The dedication ceremonies were launched by the Director of the Institute, Army Colonel Edward F. Krise. Col. Krise pointed out that "members of the Department of Defense are now challenged to bring to fruition the Human Goals program, and to demonstrate that the Armed Forces can, and will, be a model of equal opportunity for all our fellow citizens."

The second speaker was the Defense Department's top equal opportunity official, Donald L. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity). Mr. Miller emphasized a theme stressed by race relations education experts. He said that the purpose of the Institute is to give all members of the Armed Forces a better appreciation of their fellow servicemen and women "not regardless of, but because of, their individual differences of race and ethnic culture." Mr. Miller also introduced Secretary Laird as "a man who . . . believes in equality—not later but now."

From the beginning of his address, Mr. Laird made it clear that he considers the Human Goals credo not only the keystone of the equal opportunity and race relations education programs but also the basic charter governing all actions affecting people in the Department of Defense.

He pointed out that one of his first acts as Secretary of Defense was to direct the top military and civilian officials of the Department personally to help him prepare a Human Goals statement on "the objectives and principles governing our treatment of people.

"To some," he said, "this may have seemed like an unnecessary diversion of talent and intellectual resources from urgent high priority matters to matters of secondary importance and of less urgency.

"To me, however, there is no more urgent and important matter on our agenda than human relations."

Describing the Human Goals charter as "a distillation of the best thinking on this subject" of the 30 or 40 top officials of the Department of Defense, the Secretary announced in no uncertain terms that "it is not something to file and forget."

"I have made this Charter a basic guide to action throughout the Department of Defense," he said. "It is a solemn commitment which this Department has made to those who serve in it and to the people of this Nation generally."

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DRRI

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Strong Memorandum

The Defense Secretary cited other early actions which reflected his desire "to direct top-level and high-priority attention to the problems of people."

In April 1969 he issued a memorandum directing a more strenuous and more effective effort to achieve equal employment opportunity for civilian personnel within the Department and affirmed his intention of personally reviewing progress toward this objective. In May of that year he sent a memorandum to all military personnel on the subject of Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Quoting from that strongly-worded memorandum, he read:

". . . To the task of removing every vestige of discrimination I give my personal commitment. . . . Complete equality of opportunity and treatment is not to be denied to any member of the Armed Forces because of race, color, religion, national origin or any other irrelevant factor. It is the responsibility of every member of the military services from the newest inductee to the highest commissioned officer to accept other members on the basis of their individual worth and to assist in extending to all facets of military life—on and off base, on and off duty—the spirit of mutual trust and respect which is manifest when our forces are in combat. I call upon every installation and unit commander to provide the leadership that will continue to translate the policy of equal opportunity into living and meaningful reality for every man and woman serving our Nation in the uniforms of the Armed Forces."

Mr. Laird affirmed that he stands by every word of that memorandum today. He went on to point out that the Department of Defense has made vigorous efforts to achieve equality of opportunity for its people and to improve relations among them.

"It [the Department] has had many successes that we are proud of," he said. "Yet I would not claim that we have done enough. Nor would I deny that our effort has sometimes failed, and that it has sometimes been implemented unevenly.

"This Defense Race Relations Institute was established when it became apparent that more action was needed and necessary if we were to progress at an acceptable pace toward achievement of the objectives set in the Human Goals statement."



DIRECTOR AND STUDENT. Army Colonel Edward F. Krise, right, Director of the Defense Race Relations Institute, Patrick AFB, Florida, talks with Specialist Fourth Class Reginald J. Randolph, U.S. Theater Army Support Command, Europe, Worms, Germany. The DRRI student is the grandson of the noted labor leader, A. Philip Randolph, who, as a leader of the Committee Against Discrimination in the Armed Forces, helped influence President Truman to abolish segregation in the Military Services.

Turning to the causes of racial tension, the Secretary acknowledged that it is often said that the problem of race relations in the Armed Forces is but a reflection of the problem in our society as a whole. If that is true, he continued, it would follow that the problem in the Armed Forces would disappear when our society solves the problem.

To those who ask why establish a Defense Race Relations Institute now instead of waiting for society to solve the problem, he answered in two ways:

- One, "We can't wait that long."
- Two, "I believe the Defense Department should lead the way and should assist—in an appropriate manner and within the limits set by its primary mission and the availability of its resources—in finding solutions to problems which the Military Forces share with society at large."

Explains the Problem

Secretary Laird emphasized that the problems with which the Defense Department seeks to cope through the Defense Race Relations Institute are problems of attitude and behavior—and the attitudes and behavior of Service personnel are developed in the civilian society from which they come.

In order to become an efficient member of the Nation's military team, the civilian who enters the Armed Forces must modify his habits and change his behavior in many ways, Mr. Laird explained.

"The prime reason we attempt to improve relations among our people and to increase human understanding is because we are convinced this will improve the efficiency of our military organization and will reduce the risks to all the individuals concerned," he said.

The prime reason for the Institute, he stressed, is to minimize any behavior that might prevent Defense personnel from working efficiently, that might depress morale or impair the effectiveness of the Armed Forces in their job of deterring conflict—which could result in unnecessary casualties in combat.

Although he termed this the "prime" reason, the Defense Secretary made it

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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very clear that "efficiency" does not sum up all the motives behind the establishment of the Institute.

Concern for Justice

"Nor do I mean it as a full statement of your motives in being here," he told the student members of his audience. "On the contrary, I hope that all connected with this institute will bring to its work a concern for justice and a deep sympathy for their fellow man. Without these qualities you just cannot do your job well."

Will Benefit Civilian Society

Local community officials, including the county commissioners, the mayors of neighboring communities and a number of civic leaders—as well as the general public—were invited to attend the dedication, and Mr. Laird's subsequent remarks elicited special interest from that segment of his audience.

DONALD L. MILLER
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity)

He urged his listeners not to misunderstand one further point. In asserting that the efficiency of the Armed Forces is the purpose of the Institute, he emphasized that he did not mean to imply that he expected no other results.

He said that he hopes and believes that it will have many additional beneficial effects for both the Armed Forces and for civilian society, and that "it will advance us toward the goal of one Nation—under God—indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

Role of Race Relations Instructors

Addressing the student body once more, Secretary Laird stressed the vital role each graduate would play in helping his or her commanding officer to carry out the commander's training and command responsibilities. As race relations instructors, he told them, they would be responsible for giving their commanding officers "expert counsel in a delicate but important field.

"Your job is not to be an adversary to any one, but rather to be a counselor and coordinator," he observed. "Your job will be to help lessen friction and hostility among individuals who come from widely different backgrounds. Your job will be to help promote understanding among people who do not always understand each other."

He also predicted that the students would find their commanders convinced of the need for their services and eager to use their talents. He expressed his belief that "the message that a general improvement in the state of race relations is a command responsibility—and an important one—is now well understood."

Fair and Objective

He also reminded the students that in order to do their job effectively they must be fair and objective. Anyone who seeks to dampen friction between groups of people, he said, must be an "honest broker." Objectivity in this field requires recognition of accomplishment as well as of shortcomings.

"Without in any way minimizing the distance that separates us from the attain-

(See DRRI, Page 7)

WHY RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION?

In addition to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, two other key Defense officials spoke at the dedication ceremonies of the Defense Race Relations Institute. Here are excerpts from their remarks.

"We gather here to dedicate the new office and classroom facilities of an institute, the first and only of its kind, whose purpose is to provide its students and ultimately, through those students, all members of our Armed Forces, with a better appreciation of the contributions, and the inherent dignity and worth of their fellow servicemen and women, not regardless of, but because of, their individual differences of race and ethnic culture and pride."

—Donald L. Miller
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity)

"It is particularly significant, I believe, that we are located here in the area from which mankind has achieved the ages-old dream of reaching for the stars. Now we are engaged here in the achievement of another dream—the aspiration for all Americans to live together in true equality, justice and brotherhood. Just as our fellow countrymen called upon members of the Armed Forces to bring to reality the conquest of space, the members of the Department of Defense are now challenged to bring to fruition the Human Goals program, and to demonstrate that the Armed Forces can, and will, be a model of equal opportunity for all our fellow citizens."

—Colonel Edward F. Krise, USA
Director, Defense Race Relations Institute

RIBBON CUTTING. "As we cut this ribbon here today, we affirm the importance of the Defense Race Relations Institute by giving it a permanent home," says Defense chief Melvin R. Laird during dedication ceremonies. Looking on are Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Taber (left), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and Air Force Major General David M. Jones, Commander, Air Force Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB, Florida.

Prototyping and the Aerospace Industry

'Fly-Before-Buy' Benefits Analyzed

by Lieutenant General Otto J. Glasser, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development

When I was asked to dicuss prototyping, I had to ask myself: "Why? What is the interest behind prototypes?" I can't think of any subject that has generated such spontaneous and immediate support as has prototyping. Our reasons for supporting prototypes were simple and straightforward. Here was an inexpensive way to demonstrate, in hardware, new ideas or improvements on old ideas for improved military capabilities. The benefits of risk reduction, cost insight, expanded options and all the other benefits of fly-before-buy seemed obvious enough to us. There were two important fringe benefits as well. First, we could exercise some of our design teams in the cold, cruel world of real hardware, rather than in the oversimplified and forgiving world of paper designs. Second, because these were very small inexpensive programs, there was general acceptance of the notion that they could be conducted with streamlined management and minimum paperwork. Indeed, to some of us, the return to the 25-page Request for Proposal was in itself sufficient reward to justify the experiment.

Real-Life Experiences

Importantly, one could have these real-life, hardware experiences for about the same money which was previously devoted to concept formulation packages and contract definition programs, which produced nothing but paper.

But others saw different benefits. Too many in industry saw the prototype as the camel's nose under the tent. If they could only get the article designed and flying, then brochure-men could take over from there. As a minimum, foreign sales could be expected. The sticky question of what new source of production funds would be tapped to finance this bonanza has yet to be answered.

Key figures in all echelons of government could see in the prototype program an end to the aggravating cost overruns, schedule slips and performance underruns that have plagued us for so long. "Fly Before Buy," "Performance Milestones," "Design to Cost" and catchphrases were as reverently repeated as the sayings of Mao!

Especially vocal were the students of management who have been especially prolific both in the press and in testimony, extolling the outstanding performance of the French, Russian, and Swedish aerospace industries and assigning a major share of the credit for their success to prototyping.

Viewed As A Panacea

In short, prototyping is viewed as a panacea. Each sees in it the fulfillment of his dreams and the balm for his frustrations.

But, is it really the answer? Is it really all it's cracked up to be? Has the millennium really arrived when cost overruns, schedule slips, and all the rest are things of the past?

In characteristic Pentagonese, the answer is Yes and No! There is absolutely no question that a well-run prototype program will provide a generous return on our investment, and I think we're off to a very good start with our cheap, lightweight fighter prototype. As we expand the prototype program, we will develop more competent and more experienced design teams. We will increase our options for future developments for the inventory. We will gain insight into potential risks both technical and financial. And, hopefully, we will mend our management ways. But let's not expect too much! There are still other problems.

Editor's Note: Gen. Glasser made these remarks May 25 before the Aviation/Space Writers Association meeting in New York City.

Other Important Aspects

The analysts who attribute European success to prototyping have not recognized other important aspects of the European experience. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that the problem lies within the aerospace industry itself assisted, of course, by government. For reasons we could discuss the U.S. aerospace industry has become overbuilt, overmanned, and overmanaged. Not only are there too many companies, but collectively they have more production capacity than we have any conceivable future need for. The passing of relatively ineffective (and I might add inexpensive) DC-3s and P-51s has gradually rendered obsolete and archaic our production oriented industry. We will never build 18,000 B-1s as we did [of] the B-24, and we will never build 14,000 F-15s as we did [of] P-51s in World War II. Nor is the 20,000 production record of the DC-3 likely to be toppled by any contemporary production run. Yet, the production orientation of industry persists. One reads a great deal about the inefficiency of underused educational facilities. What about the inefficiency of unused aerospace facilities? Who pays for these inefficiencies? These costs appear in the next contract or the next subcontract, driving up costs so that quantities are even further reduced.

Let's look at the European examples. Does France do that? No. As long ago as 1936, France began collecting its fragmented industry into a nationalized sector and a private sector. Today, that collectivization is essentially complete with only Aerospatiale and Dassault remaining as full-fledged companies. Even here, the emphasis is less on production. Dassault is much more of a design and development agency than it is a production plant. Major portions of the production are farmed out to production companies having little or no engineering design capability.

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DRRI

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ment of the objectives in the Human Goals Charter, let us recognize how far we have come. Let us view our accomplishments and successes through the same end of the telescope through which we survey our shortcomings and failures," he urged.

Armed Forces Can Boast

In citing some of the things which the Armed Forces can boast about in the field of human relations, Mr. Laird noted that segregation was ended in the military before even a start was made in many aspects of civilian life. Since then equal opportunity has become a fact for more and more people in the military each year, he said. In comparing minorities' oportunities for advancement with those available in any civilian business organization, the Services do not suffer from that comparison, he asserted.

"I am proud of the increase in the number of non-whites in our Service academies, of the increase in the number of ROTC units in predominantly non-white colleges, of the increase in the number of top officer and NCO jobs held by minority-group members in both combat and specialist fields," Mr. Laird stated.

On the other hand, he warned, he remains concerned about those areas where progress is still too slow. Determined to deal with these problems, he concluded, the Department of Defense has not only established the Defense Race Relations Institute but has affirmed its importance by giving it a permanent home.

[*NOTE: For further details on the Defense Race Relations Institute and the Race Relations Education Program, see the May 25, 1972 issue of COMMANDERS DIGEST, page 6, "The Armed Forces Lead the Way."*]



PONDERING THE PROBLEMS. At lunch following the dedication ceremonies Secretary Laird discusses Race Relations Institute program with students DTI Frank Listenbee (right), U.S. Naval Hospital, Great Lakes, Ill., and Air Force TSGT James W. Moss, Jr. (center), Base Personnel Office, Vance AFB, Okla.
(Official U.S. Air Force Photos)

PROTOTYPING

(Continued from Page 6)

The design bureaus of Russia do not produce their designs. Production is assigned to a production agency based on availability and current workload. And, of course, Sweden, with its lone corporation, never faces the problem.

Another Major Difference

Let's look at another major difference between U.S. and European organizations. The European approach is characterized by very small, tightly integrated design teams manned by "top of their graduating class" engineers. Every man is an expert with considerable latitude for decision and very streamlined and abbreviated supervisory and management channels. Paperwork of all types is brief, concise, and limited in distribution. Contracts, directives and reports run to tens of pages rather than tens of volumes.

But what of the U.S. counterpart? We are literally suffocating from excess manning and excessive management—and I find it hard to separate cause from effect. An additional management procedure requires additional people to carry it out. In turn, this expanded team of managers comes up with proposed new economies and new efficiencies which require more directives, more controls, more reports and, in turn, more people, ad nauseam. I don't mean to discredit all managers and all management, but when you have more monitors than doers, the time has come to reverse the trend. I believe middle management featherbedding has become an endemic disease in the U.S., not only in industry, but in all echelons, public and private.

What Can Be Done?

Well, what can be done to improve this dreary picture? Attractive as it may seem to be able to direct industry into an optimum configuration, this could only be achieved at the expense of our free enterprise system—and that is simply too high a price to pay. No, the problem is up to all of us and especially the Board of Directors and stockholders. There needs to be more mergers and more transitions to a new product line. This is a slow process, at best, and is evolutionary.

There is hope, however, that the prototype activities might accelerate the evolution. For one thing, the really competent design team might emerge for a steady flow of awards, thus causing the ascendence of the highly successful and dependable team, and the atrophy and eventual demise of the least competent. The corporation that never wins an award might get the word and convert to a different product line. The outstanding company might recognize from his prototype efforts the efficacy and efficiency of the streamlined approach and he might even apply it to his regular business. The millennium would be achieved when the government also recognized these rewards and did likewise!

I'm sure this Utopian scene I have sketched is a long way off but I also know that until some of us in government, in industry, and all other walks get with it and actively work toward it, it will continue to be just that—a Utopian goal. Prototyping is the first step in the right direction. We've taken that. Now, let's get about the others with equal enthusiasm.

DISASTER CONTROL CENTER. Personnel assigned to nearby Ellsworth AFB manned the Civil Defense Disaster Control Center in Rapid City, coordinating all flood relief and recovery activity. (Official U.S. Air Force Photo by SSgt. Don Cox)

South Dakota Disaster Relief

Disaster relief activities for the flood conditions in South Dakota are dramatic illustrations of outstanding cooperation among the Department of Defense, state and local governments and volunteer organizations during an emergency situation.

After two days of heavy rains, the local Civil Defense Director, in conjunction with Rapid City government agencies, began alerting the local population that the Canyon Lake Dam was in danger of giving way and that precautionary evacuations from the area should be taken.

When the dam did break and flash floods swept through the area, a Civil Defense Emergency Operations Center was established in Rapid City to coordinate all disaster relief operations.

Department of Defense agencies responded to calls for assistance by providing communications, medicine, security, potable water, shelter, search and rescue operations, personnel and equipment. Approximately 4,000 Army, Air Force and South Dakota State National Guard personnel were committed to relief operations.

Fifteen Army, Air Force and National Guard helicopters were used in rescue and medical evacuation missions. Air Force aircraft were used to transport several mobile canteens, heavy equipment and supplies into nearby Ellsworth AFB for use in the afflicted area.

During the first three days, the base laundry worked double ships to launder pieces of linen for the local hospitals. The base food services provided 2,000 pounds of fried chicken, 2,000 hamburgers and 280 box lunches.

Corps of Engineer personnel were dispatched to the flood scene within 24 hours to assist in the flood fighting, recovery and debris removal efforts. Fort Mead Dam, 20 miles northwest of Rapid City, had been weakened and was also in danger of failure. Corps of Engineer personnel took emergency corrective action to pump water from the reservoir, repair and lower the dam and enlarge spillways to prevent further serious flood damage.

Army personnel from Fort Carson, Colorado, assisted city and Red Cross officials in providing for and manning temporary mortuary facilities.

The Civil Defense Communication network was used to transmit the request for a disaster area declaration and also handled welfare reports for the Red Cross. In addition, five Department of Defense Civil Defense specialists were dispatched to assist in the operation of the Emergency Operations Center.

As *Commanders Digest* went to press, the Department of Defense emergency actions were still active in South Dakota and were to continue as long as required.

DOMESTIC ACTION: Disast

When the Chips Are Down

DoD Units Pla

CLEANUP OPERATIONS. Ellsworth provided numerous pieces of heavy equipment and operators to assist with the massive flood cleanup operations in Rapid City. (Official U.S. Air Force Photo by SSgt. Don Cox)



AFTER THE FLOOD. Airmen from the 821st Civil Engineering Squadron at Ellsworth AFB assist in the massive cleanup job begun after flood waters subsided. (Official U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt. Mike Dorlath)

Down

s Play Vital Role In Rapid City Flood

Special to Commanders Digest

Even before raging flood waters, caused by torrential rains in the Black Hills, had subsided, Ellsworth AFB was at work assisting its neighbors in Rapid City, S.D., and the surrounding area to recover from the worst disaster ever to hit that locale.

The flood swept through Rapid City and other smaller communities late Friday night and early Saturday morning, June 9-10.

Heavy rains—an estimated seven inches of water within two hours—began falling in the hills at 7 p.m. Friday. The deluge turned small creeks into major rivers that swept toward Rapid City.

As the waters mounted and initial warnings were made to Rapid City residents, Col. George F. Bennett, 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) Commander, assembled his staff for a natural disaster meeting at the Wing command post.

Colonel Bennett had taken command of the 44th SMW less than 24 hours earlier.

At approximately 11 p.m. Friday, water broke through Canyon Lake dam on the edge of Rapid City and the torrent swept through the community. The Ellsworth rescue effort, controlled and coordinated from the command post, began immediately.

At about midnight, bus loads of Ellsworth personnel were dispatched to Rapid City to assist civilian authorities with rescue operations. The base people waded through chest-deep water and battled against strong currents to reach flood victims trapped inside their homes or in trees.

Throughout the long night and into the early morning, base personnel, divided into 20 separate teams, rescued scores of persons and transported injured people to local hospitals.

Flood waters had also struck the small community of Box Elder that borders on Ellsworth.

Simultaneous with the Rapid City rescue operation, Ellsworth Security Police were dispatched to Box Elder with boats to pick up survivors.

At the same time the Ellsworth Community Center and Gymnasium were prepared as temporary shelters to accept flooded-out area residents.

The Ellsworth disaster assistance effort increased in both size and scope Saturday morning as the extent of flood damage in the surrounding area became apparent.

Base volunteers continued to assist with rescue work Saturday. Ellsworth also sent massive amounts of heavy equipment, medical supplies, food and water into the stricken area throughout the day.

The equipment included heavy trucks, passenger trucks, pickups, tractors, dump trucks and radio vehicles. Ellsworth families donated food, clothing and blankets as the number of flood victims arriving on base increased.

Ellsworth people also shared their homes with displaced area residents. Base dining facilities were put on around-the-clock operation to feed the many flood victims.

Food service personnel also helped prepare food for homeless flood victims at various points in Rapid City.

Through coordination at the Ellsworth command post, vehicles, supplies and personnel were dispatched to aid the surrounding community through Saturday, Sunday and the rest of the week.

The U.S. Air Force Hospital at Ellsworth sent typhoid and tetanus vaccines to inoculation centers. The hospital also sent supplies, including sponges, cotton and packets of purification tablets.

The 821st Communications Squadron gave technical advice to the Rapid City Emergency Control Center and many Ellsworth personnel helped to man the center.

COLLECTION POINT. Ellsworth Family Service volunteers set up the Base Community as a collection point for food and clothing donated by Ellsworth personnel to aid flood victims in neighboring communities.
(Official U.S. Air Force Photo by SSgt. Don Cox)

The Base's Transportation Squadron provided many needed vehicles throughout the recovery operation; the Supply Squadron furnished blankets and hard hats to the cleanup crews.

Ellsworth also provided valuable helicopter support for rescue, reconnaissance and cargo airlift. Helicopters flew 70 hours transporting over 201 people and rescuing 14.

On Monday, a special effort was made to assist Box Elder in its recovery operation. A total of 80 personnel and 23 vehicles were dispatched to the small community to provide assistance.

The Ellsworth effort in Rapid City did not slacken. Over 125 military vehicles were dispatched on Monday to aid in cleaning up that city.

The number of base personnel sent to Rapid City remained at a high level, with 1,143 working Sunday, June 11, and 950 on Monday, June 12.

Reduction the Key

New Classification Procedures Summarized

Removing security classification authority from a number of offices and people within the Government Executive Departments and Agencies—including the Defense Department—will help to reduce the amount of classified information. And, this is but one of the several important improvements resulting from President Richard Nixon's Executive Order 11652 which went into effect June 1.

Other highlights were summarized by the President when he signed the Federal document into law Mar. 8. They were:

—Rules for classifying documents are more restrictive.

—Timetables ranging from six to ten years have been set for the automatic declassificaion of documents. Exceptions will be allowed only for such information which falls within four specifically defined categories.

—Any documents exempted from automatic declassification will be subject to mandatory review upon request after a ten-year period, so long as the document can be adequately identified and obtained by the Government with a reasonable amount of effort.

—If information is still classified 30 years after origination, it will then be automatically declassified unless the head of the originating Department personally determines, in writing, that its continued protection is still necessary, and he sets a time for declassification.

—Sanctions may be imposed upon those who abuse the system, and,

—A continuing monitoring process will be set up under the National Security Council and an Interagency Classification Review Committee whose chairman is appointed by the President.

President Nixon, on May 17, appointed John S. D. Eisenhower as Chairman of the Interagency Classification Review Committee. Mr. Eisenhower is the son of the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In announcing the appointment, the President said, "Overseeing our new approach to Government documents will not be an easy task, for a delicate balance must be struck between the public's right to know and the Government's obligation to protect the national security."

Basically, the Interagency Classification Review Committee is an innovation of the Executive Order. It provides for the first time a continuing mechanism to examine the effectiveness and the implementation of the Executive Order. Also, it makes it possible to address one of the most fundamental problems in any classification system—assurance that decisions to classify or not to classify are responsible and objective.

The term "national security," as used in the Presidential order, includes both national defense and foreign relations matters. The term "national security," rather than "national defense," denotes that the category of information requiring protection is broader than military information. It is also more consistent with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (Section 552 of Title 5, U.S. Code). This exempts from public disclosure matters that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."

The three categories of classified information under Executive Order 11652 remain the same: Top Secret, Secret and Confidential.

The new Order, however, is more restrictive. Only a limited number of officials within a Department or Agency are given the authority to delegate Top Secret classification. And, Top Secret now may *not* be delegated below the level of principal deputies or assistants of major elements of the Department or Agency.

Another new feature of the Order is that it now authorizes senior officials to delegate to others in his Department or Agency the authority to downgrade and declassify. However, the person possessing the authority to classify shall be accountable for the propriety of the classification actions.

The General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652 provides that:

—Top Secret information be automatically downgraded to Secret at the end of two years; downgraded to Confidential at the end of four years; and, declassified at the end of ten years.

—Secret information be automatically downgraded to Confidential at the end of two years and automatically declassified at the end of eight years.

—Confidential information be automatically declassified at the end of six years.

However, four limited and specific categories of information are authorized to be exempted from the General Declassification Schedule (GDS) specified in the new Order. They are:

—Classified information or material furnished by foreign governments or international organizations and held by the United States on the understanding that it be kept in confidence.

—Classlfied information or material specifically covered by statute, or pertaining to crytography, or disclosing intelligence sources or methods.

—Classified information or material disclosing a project, plan installation or system or a specific foreign relations matter the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security.

—Classified information or material the disclosure of which would place a person in immediate jeopardy.

Although these categories are exempt from the GDS, such material is made subject to a mandatory classification review any time after the expiration of ten years from the date or origin upon request by a Department or a member of the public.

In addition to this review at the end of ten years, the new Order provides for the automatic declassification at the end of 30 years from origination of all classified information—unless the head of the originating Department personally determines in writing at the end of 30 years that continuing protection is essential to the national security or that its disclosure would place a person in immediate jeopardy.

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any ABM systems or their components except as provided therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited deployment of such systems described in the next two paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one deployment area centered on the nation's capital and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) within one other deployment area having the same radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The centers of the two deployment areas will be separated by no less than 1,300 kilometers.

In each of these deployment areas a Party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. These totals would include any deployments within such areas for training purposes and, as indicated in Article II(2), would not be confined to those in operattional status. In view of Article V(1), discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM components may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern type which scans by electronic means, a capability especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical-scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM radar complexes, the permitted area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars may not be located outside such complexes, regardless of when they become operational. Mechanical-scan ABM radars that become operational after May 26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties understand that in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with this provision, the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may have:

—2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in such a deployment area; and

—no more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large phased-array ABM radars referred to above.

The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in such a deployment area on the date of signature were the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand that the potential —the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters —of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems currently deployed or under construction would be as follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being deployed by the United States in the vicinity of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it would preclude the completion or retention of the ABM complex on which construction had been started in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. (The signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that would be prohibited thereby in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at a deployment area centered on its national capital, and the Soviet Union has not started construction at a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

(2) Development, Testing and Other Limitations

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(1) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

(3) Future ABM Systems

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars:

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Article II(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

(4) Modernization and Replacement

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM systems or components is constrained by the various limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See paragraph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and Article VI.)

(5) Destruction and Dismantling

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Since no more than one ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted by Article III, this Article will apply, when the Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components previously under construction in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

B. OTHER RELATED MEASURES

(1) Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Components

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their location along the periphery of each Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be affected.

(2) International Transfers

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

(3) Conflicting Obligations

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligation of the United States under any international agreement.

C. VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION

(1) Verification

Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions,

which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification.

The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion, and overhaul practices.

(2) Standing Consultative Commission

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty—such as agreed interpretations after the treaty has entered into force—and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibility of the Commission under the Interim Agrement, see section C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

D. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decision is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

> The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The U.S.S.R. Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the U.S.S.R. does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we

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emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

E. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These questions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authenticity of the English and Russian language texts.

INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that:

—the aggregate number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launcher will be limited;

—starting construction of additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers is prohibited;

—the number of launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to that number currently operational and under construction;

—ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines operational on each side; and

—up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of additional SLBM launchers above a specified number for each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on older ballistic missile submarines.

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

A. ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I prescribes July 1, 1972 as the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active construction estimated to be about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and training purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in effect, neither Party may start new construction (nor resume previously suspended construction) of fixed ICBM launchers except test and training launchers.

B. HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10-15 per cent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that

of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM.

C. SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition, Article III and the Protocol permit launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the United States, subject to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, such substitution may not result in:

—the Soviet Union having operational more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines and all modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine;

—the United States having operational more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 710 SLBM launchers.

Construction of replacement SLBM launchers up to the limits under the Protocol would require the dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers deployed on any type of submarine would count against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dismantling or destruction would be required to commence no later than the date on which sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to begin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dismantling or destruction as well as timely notification thereof, are to be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

D. TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS

The Parties agree that the number of test and training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, including "modern heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased significantly above the current number of test and training launchers for such missiles. It is understood that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for the purposes of testing and training. It is also understood that ICBM launchers for test and training purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

E. MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Interim Agreement may be undertaken. The conversion of current United States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles, the conversion of current submarine launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the construction of new submarines as replacements for older submarines, are not prohibited by the Agreement.

F. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the same provisions on verification as appear in Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried out by national technical means operating in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. Interference with, or deliberate concealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither Party is required to change its current practices of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission to be established pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue active negotiation for limitations on strategic offensive arms. This Article also provides that the terms of this Interim Agreement will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that these subsequent negotiations will start in the near future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the Interim Agreement shall remain in effect for five years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each Party with a right, parallel to that contained in paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Interim Agreement.

CONCLUSION

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, together with the accompanying Interim Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic offensive arms, constitute the most important step in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In these agreements, the two most powerful nations on earth are adopting measures designed to curb the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests during the careful negotiation and elaboration of these agreements. We did not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our Allies, who were regularly consulted during the negotiations. The Congress has been kept closely informed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador Smith and other Delegation members conducted a total of thirty executive session briefings for Congressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order. The entry into force of these measures should significantly advance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope that they can be brought into force as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Enclosures:

1. The ABM Treaty.
2. The Interim Agreement and associated Protocol.
3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements.

ARMED FORCES INITIATIVES

DOMESTIC ACTION. Making war on lead-poisoning among slum-area children is a continuing battle for personnel of the 356th Civil Affairs Area (B), Bronx, N.Y., and their allies from the New York City Public Health Service and the Bronx Hospital (photo). The Army Reserve unit, and its parent organization—the 353d Civil Affairs Area (A)—is cooperating with the Public Health Service in locating and treating those afflicted children who have contracted lead poisoning by ingesting lead-containing paint chips and plaster from the walls and ceilings of tenement buildings. **(Official U.S. Army Photo)**

". . . To contribute to the improvement of our society . . . by greater utilization of our human and physical resources. . . ."
—Human Goals Credo

DOMESTIC ACTION. Old Navy ships stricken from active service will soon be used for the creation of underwater fish havens. The Navy will assist the Tidewater Artificial Reef Association of Virginia with a project to create an artificial reef off the coast of Norfolk, Va. The program involves placing unserviceable landing craft and floating causeways off the coast in areas not already provided with scuttled wooden fishing trawlers and concrete-filled tires. Also, Florida is designing an artificial reef near Key West, where the Navy is expected to sink at least one decommissioned cruiser, the USS Wilkes-Barre. To comply with state regulations, the ship was cleaned to remove all potential pollutants from the hull.

DOMESTIC ACTION. An Army physician from the Letterman General Hospital, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., recently completed a tour of duty on a Montana Indian reservation. At the request of the Flying Samaritans, a San Francisco charitable organization, Captain Robert A. Davis spent three weeks working in a 35-bed hospital and clinic on the Blackfoot reservation near Browning, Mont. He was a member of a three-physician team handling as many as 200 outpatient visits daily.

DOMESTIC ACTION. A whale of a job was done recently by the Equipment Operations Division of the Transportation Department, Naval Underseas Research and Development Center, San Diego, Calif. Sailors figured prominently in the release of Gigi, a California gray whale, on March 13. Gigi had been the subject of scientific research at the San Diego Sea World where she helped furnish information that might lead to the preservation of the species. The sailors loaded Gigi aboard a 60-ton floating crane, and released her later in the day off Mission Beach.

DOMESTIC ACTION. High over the Colorado countryside, an F-101B streaks toward an enemy that is preparing to rain destruction on the crops below. The pilot fires fifty tiny rockets that contain payloads of tiny particles of lead or silver iodide designed to make the storm clouds give up their moisture before they can form hailstones large enough to be destructive to crops and other property. The weather modification program is part of a study by the Colorado State University Department of Atmospheric Science to find ways to lessen the severity of hailstorms. For the past two years, the university has had backup support from the Navy's Pacific Missile Range, Point Mugu, Calif. It is estimated that the work can save farmers millions of dollars each year.

DOMESTIC ACTION. Volunteers from Bergstrom AFB, Texas, came to the aid of New Braunfels, 50 miles away, when the town was hit by a devastating flood recently. The Chief of Police said, "The airmen were a tremendous help. They participated in every aspect of cleanup and rescue. There is no easy way to say thanks. . . ."

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